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ABS TRACT
This paper analyzes inevitable transitions between fixed and
floating exchange-rate regimes in a balance—of—payments model where
individual preferences are explicitly specified. The goal is to assess
the analogy between speculative attacks in foreign exchange markets and
attacks on official price—fixing schemes in natural resource markets.
In discrete time the analogy with resource markets is only partially
correct, for in a deterministic model the collapse of a fixed rate may
be characterized by two, successive attacks. The two-attack equilibrium
is peculiar to discrete-time analysis, however. In the continuous-time
limit of discrete—time models there is a single attack timed so as to
rule out an anticipated discrete jump in the exchange rate.
Balance—of—payments models differ from nonrenewable resource
models in that foreign exchange reserves may be borrowed from abroad.
The paper therefore asks whether there are limits to central-bank
borrowing possibilities. In an idealized world where all private income
is subject to lump—sum taxation, central-bank reserves can become infinitely
negative with no violation of the public sector's intertemporal budget
constraint. Nonetheless, a growth rate of domestic credit exceeding the
world interest rate, if maintained indefinitely, leads to violation of the




New Ybrk, New York 10027
(212) 280—5489Introduction
Whenacentral bank's foreign exchange reserves are limited,
excessive domestic credit expansion must eventually undermine any attempt
to maintain a pegged exchange rate through official intervention. A
growing literature, beginning with the work of Krugman (1979), studies
aspects of the process through which the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate occurs.1 Under rational expectations and unrestricted private
capital mobility, the transition between fixed and floating exchange
rate occurs on a well—defined date and is forced by a speculative attack
in which private wealth owners suddenly acquire the entire central-bank
reserve stock.
The literature on balance—of-payments crises grows directly out
of Salant and Henderson's (1978) insight that a government attempt to
fix the real price of an exhaustible natural resource will generally
lead to a speculative attack on the official stockpile. Salant (1983)
elaborates on this result and extends it in several directions. In
Salant's (1983) setup, speculators maximize the discounted value of profits
from the sale of an exhaustible resource; the discount rate is exogenous.
When the government first pegs the resource price at a level greater that
the competitive level, speculators sell their stocks to the government. But
they repurchase the entire remaining government stockpile (thereby destroying
the price-fixing scheme) on the first day that the resource's free-market price
equals or exceeds its official price. Any delay would result in a resource-
price path offering returns exceeding the exogenous market rate.2
It is tempting to proceed by analogy and argue that a balance-of-2
payments crisis must also occur as soon as the floating exchange rate
that would equilibrate markets in the wake of a speculativeattack equals or
exceeds the official parity. There are two problems with thisanalogy.
First, the world supply of any exhaustible resource is fixed ata point
in time, whereas a central bank facing a perfect worldcapital market
can always create (gross) foreign exchange reserves by borrowing.Thus,
negative reserve positions are feasible. Second, the speculative attack
in resource markets is derived essentially by imposing thecondition that
perfectly substitutable assets-—that is, resource stocks and "other
wealth"--must yield the same rate of return in equilibrium.Balance—
of—payments crises, however, involve arbitrage between domesticmoney
and foreign bonds, assets which presumably are notperfect substitutes.
Continuous-time analyses such as Krugman's (1979) rely on theasset-price
continuity principle (Calvo 1977), arguing that any discreteanticipated up-
ward jump in the exchange rate would induce agents to flee the domesticcur-
rency "an instant before," and thus would be arbitraged away in equilibrium.
As in the exhaustible resource literature, therefore, the speculativeattack
occurs as soon as the "shadow" market exchange rate exceeds thepeg. But
while this argument is plausible in continuous time, it is unclear that
it extends to discrete—time models.3
This paper analyzes inevitable transitions between fixed- and
floating-rate regimes in a balance-of-payments model where individual
intertemporal preferences are explicitly specified. The equilibria
studied are perfect-foresight equilibria in which (i)agents maximize
utility, given expected prices and net government transfers; (ii) the3
government's policies staisfy its intertemporal resource constraint,
given private money demand and shared expectations about prices and
transfers; and (iii) markets clear on each date at the prices expected.
Beside throwing light on the nature of balance-of-payments crises, the
framework also yields insight into the limits to external borrowing by
central banks.
With respect to balance—of-payments crises, the paper shows that
in discrete time the analogy with resource models is partially correct.
A speculative attack always occurs on the first date such that the
"shadow" floating rate equals or exceeds the fixed rate; but equilibrium
may be characterized by two attacks on successive dates. If there are
two attacks, the first of these occurs the period before the exchange rate
first floats as agents reduce their real balances in anticipation of the
subsequent depreciation. A second speculative attack, in which the re-
maining official reserves are acquired by the market, collapses the fixed
rate and validates the marketts expectations.The two-attack equilibrium
turns out to be peculiar to discrete—time analysis. In continuous time,
there is a unique attack timed so as to rule out an anticipated discrete
jump in the exchange rate. Thus, the solution procedure used in the
descriptive continuous—time literature is supported.
With respect to central—bank borrowing possibilities, the paper
shows that in an idealized world where all private income is subject to
lump-sum taxes, central-bank reserves can become infinitely negative with
L4
no violation of the government's intertemporal budget contraint. Even in
this setting some limits to domestic—credit expansion exist, however.
The government budget constraint implies that domestic credit must grow4
at a rate below the world real interest rate when the exchange rate is
fixed and there is no economic growth. In this sense, an announced and
credible policy of excessive domestic-credit expansion may leave the
central bank unable to borrow reserves abroad.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the
individual's optimization problem. Section II discusses the consolidated
public—sector intertemporal budget constraint and the intertemporal
material balance that must obtain for the economy in perfect—foresight
equilibrium. Section III shows that domestic credit growth rates below
the world interest rate need not lead to a breakdown of the fixed—rate
regime or any violation of the official budget constraint. Section IV
studies discrete—time equilibria in which crises occur, while section
V extends this analysis to continuous time by allowing the market period
of section IV to shrink to zero.
An important limitation of the present framework is the
nonstochastic environment assumed. Section VI discusses this limitation (as
well as some others), emphasizing that in a stochastic modelany number
of speculative attacks may precede the fixed exchange rate's collapse.
An appendix containing technical details concludes the paper.5
I. The Individual's Problem
The analysis is set in a small economy whose residents consume
a single perishable commodity, available domestically in a fixed supply
y. Agents may hold wealth in the form of domestic money, bonds denominated
in domestic currency, and bonds denominated in foreign currency. A dom-
estic—currency bond is an instrument that yields r units of domestic
currency after a period and has a fixed face value equal to one unit
of domestic money. A foreign—currency bond pays r* units of the foreign
currency after a period and has a face value of one foreign-currency unit. The
exchange rate S is the domestic-currency price of foreign money. In this
single—good world, the domestic price level P and the foreign price level
p are linked by the relation P =SP.p* and r* are constants, and P =
Thereis a single representative agent who maximizes a discounted
sum of future instantaneous utilities. Real domestic monetary balances are as-
sumed to yield direct utility (perhaps because they reduce transaction costs,
as in Brock [1984] ,Feenstra[1984], or Gray [1984]); and, as ususal, instan-
taneous utility is derived also from consumption of the single commodity.
If M denotes nominal money holdings and m real money holdings M/P, the






where =1/(1+5)and ,therate of time preference, is positive.
A typical agent begins each period t holding Mt_i units of domestic
money, 3t-l units of domestic—currency bonds, and units of foreign—6
currency bonds. The agent then receives his endowment y, the nominal
interest payments r1B1 andr*B1, and a money transfer Ht from the
government he decides on consuniptionc; and he allocates his implied
end-of-period nominal assets At among MtiB; and B. More formally,
the individual's accumulation program satisfies the constraints
At -At_i
=Sy+ r1B1 + (r*St + St —Sti)B*+ H - (2)
AtMt+Bt+5B*. (3)
An appendix shows how to derive necessary conditions foran optimal
individual program. If corner solutions are not optimal, the conditionsare
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u'(c) =B(l+ r*)u(c1). (6)
Condition (4) states that an individual following an optimalprogram cannot
raise his utility by adding a unit of domesticmoney to his portfolio at
time t and spending it at time t+l. Condition (5) states thatalong an
optimal program, utility is not raised if a domestic-currency bond is
added to the portfolio at time t and sold at time t+i. Condition(6) is the7
analogous requirement for foreign—currency bonds.
Equations (4)-(6) naturally imply relations between the required
marginal returns on the three assets. In particular, (5) and (6) yield
the uncovered interest parity condition
(S+i/S) (1 + r*) =(1+ r) , (7)
which equates the real returns on domestic- and foreign-currency bonds.
It is convenient .to assume that the subjective time-preference rate
6 satisfies
(8)
Equations (6) and (8) imply that the representative agent will choose a
constant level of consumption, c.6 Optimality requires that c be the
highest constant consumption level consistent with the individual's
available lifetime resources.
To derive the lifetime resource constraint, define real assets
a (Mt + Bt)/S + 8* and realtransfers h E H/S. Constraint (2) may
now be written in real terms (using (7)) as
a =(1+ r*)at++ ht -c
-[r*+ (St -S1)/S]m1.
(9)
Through successive substitutions, (9) implies8
-t -t (1 +r*)a1




If urn (1 +r*)_tat
<0,the individual's debts grow (at least) at the t-
rate 1 +r*,so that interest payments on existing liabilities are always
financed though fresh borrowing. Such behavior would allow unbounded
lifetime consumption, and is assumed to be prohibited. Thus, private
expenditure plans must satisfy urn (1 +r*)tat >0.(For further
t-+c
discussionsee Arrow and Kurz [1970, chapter VIII or, in an open-economy
context, Obstfeld [19811.) By (10), this lifetime resource constraint






Inequality (11) restricts the present value of spending on consumption
and on the services of real balances to the value of real wealth at the
beginning of period 0. The latter consists of initial real marketable assets
(1 +r*)a1plus the present value of current and future endowments and
government transfers.(Note that a1 is the ex-dividend real value
of marketable assets at the end of period -1. In period 0, before inter-
est payments are made, the value of those assets is (1 +r*)a1.)If an
individual's plan is optimal, c (and the path of real balances implied
by (4)) will be such that (11) holds with equality.9
II. The External Constraint
The previous section described the intertemporal budget constraint
of the typical individual. That budget constraint restricts discounted
lifetime expenditure to the present value of lifetime resources, and
thus rules out unbounded consumption financed by ever—increasing
borrowing. This section takes up the analogous intertemporal budget
constraint for the public sector, viewed as a composite entity comprising
both the fiscal and monetary authorities. As will be shown, there is no
limit on the level of the government's external debt in a world with
lump—sum taxation. However, the rate at which this debt grows must be
less than 1 + r* if the government is to satisfy its intertemporal
budget constraint. Because domestic credit creation in excess of any
increase in money demand leads to foreign reserve losses-—that is, to
external borrowing by the central bank—-an upper bound on the feasible rate
of domestic—credit expansion is implied.
The government's objective is to finance an exogenous path of
real consumption .Governmentconsumption g does not enter the
private utility function directly. To finance its consumption, the
government may levy lump—sum taxes, spend the interest earnings on the
central bank's foreign reserves, or print money (thus expanding somestic
credit). Let D denote the nominal stock of central-bank domestic credit





Implicit in (12) is the assumption that the fiscal authority does not
itself issue debt to private agents, domestic or foreign.
Excessive domestic credit growth will lead to official foreign
borrowing through central—bank reserve loss, however. Let Md denote domestic
demand for nominal balances and assume foreigners do not hold domestic money.











Equation (14) reveals that government purchases can be financed through
money issue only to the extent that the demand for money is increasing.
Private money demand thus limits the available revenue from seigniorage.
Money creation in excess of this limit leads directly to reserve losses; and
when official reserves are declining, government purchases are being
financed in part through external borrowing.
After successive substitutions, (14) becomes
(1 + r*)R*1 + to + r*) td + [(St -Stl)/S]mdi}
-t -t —urn(1 + r*) = (1+ r*)(g + h), (15)
t-+
where rnd is the demand for real balances and md md —rnd .If t t t t—l11
urn (1. +r*)tR
<0,the public sector does not repay its debts
t0D
asymptotically; instead, it incurs new debt to meet the interest pay-
ments due on its previous borrowing. If such behavior is prohibited (as in
the individual's case), lim (1 +r*)tR
>0,and the government's inter-
t--
temporal budget constraint is
(1 +r*)R*1
+J0(1
+r*)t{Ad +[(Se — S1)/StJrni}
-t + r*) + hf). (16)
Accordingto (16), the government's real outlays (consisting of government con-
sumption and net transfers to the private sector) cannot exceed the sum of its
initial foreign reserves (1 +r*)R*1
and its discounted seigniorage. The
government collects seigniorage by supplying the money necessary to accommodate
increases in desired real balances (ataconstant price level) ,andby
providing the money agents need to maintain a given level of real balances
in the face of inflation.
Assume now that the public correctly anticipates the path of govern-
ment transfers and, given a price path {s}0i chooses consumption and
real-balance paths maximizing (1) subject to (11) ,givena1 and m1.
Assume further that government outlays satisfy inequality (16) when
is the real-balance path chosen by the public. In this perfect-
foresight equilibrium, (11) and (16) may be added to yield
-t d d
(1 +r*)[a1 ++ (y/r*)]+ + r*)(mt —m1)
-t d tio' +r*)(c ++ r*mt1).12
Because a =m+ (B/S) + B*, the foregoing inequality simplifies to
-t (1 + r*) [(B1/S1) + + R*1 + (y/r*)] + r*) (c +. (17)
It follows that in perfect—foresight equilibrium, the present value of
aggregate (private plus public) consumption cannot exceed the present
value of the economy's total nonmonetary assets: net claims onforeigners
held by the public and the central bank and the present value ofoutput.
If foreigners demanded domestic money, the government's resources could
be augmented through the sale of domestic money abroad. Asmoney is
a nontraded asset, however, all seigniorage is extracted from domestic
residents.
Given an exchange—rate path and the associatedpath of real
money demand, a particular domestic-credit growth rule determinesa
path of external borrowing by the central bank. Thatpath must be
consistent with the government's intertemporalresource constraint in
equilibrium. The next section examines the implications ofthis
requirement for domestic-credit growth in the context ofa fixed
exchange rate regime.13
III. Fixed Exchange Rates and the Limit to Domestic Credit Growth
The preceding discussion of the sectoral and aggregate constraints
has been developed without reference to the exchange—rate regime. Its
implications may, however, be exploited to throw light on the limit to
domestic-credit creation under a pegged—rate regime. For this purpose, it
is assumed that the central bank pegs the exchange rate on each date t at
the constant level S.(A moving peg could be analyzed as easily, but the
fixed—rate case is assumed to economize on notation.) The central bank
undertakes whatever foreign exchange market intervention is necessary to
enforce the target rate S.
Discussion of the limit to domestic-credit expansion under this
regime requires a determination of the path of real money demand. If the
central bank does not "overaccumulate" foreign reserves-—that is, if
lim (1 +r*)tR
=0—-then(16) holds with equality. Because (11) neces-
t-14
sarily holds with equality along an optimal individual program, (17)
must hold with equality in equilibrium. The equilibrium constant consumption
level associated with the government consumption path in (17) is
thus the highest constant conumption level such that (17) is an equality
when c =cfor all t >0.By (4), equilibrium real balances inunderthe
pegged-rate regime are constant and satisfy
v'(rn) =(1—)u'(c) (18)
for this equilibrium consumption level c. It is important to note for
future reference that c is invariant across exchange—rate regimes.7
Consider now the consequences for the bank's reserve position of
alternative transfer policies fh}0 ,giventhe paths of money demand




under which the public sector rebates to citizens real foreign reserve
earnings net of government consumption. Domestic inflation is zero under
the fixed—rate regime, so (14) shows that reserves are constant under rule
(19) 8
The foregoing transfer rule is a member of the broader class
h =r*R1
—g + (0 —1)(D1/S) (20)









If 0exceedsunity, the public sector in effect finances part of its
spending by borrowing abroad. Because equilibrium real money demand is
fixed, money transfers in excess of the value given by (19) must be
purchased by the central bank to maintain the fixed exchange rate. It
follows that excessive transfer payments lead to a private capital out-
flow which has as its counterpart the official reserve loss given by (21)
What limits does the intertemporal budget constraint (16) place on
such official foreign borrowing? The program described by (20) is con-






thatis, if and only if a <(1+r*).Thus,provid1 the rate of domestic
credit growth is smaller than the world real interest rate, the implied
path of external borrowing is consistent with the government's resource
constraint. In particular, there is no lower bound on the leve of16
international reserves: these can become increasingly negativeover
time as the central bank defends the exchange rate. But thereare rates
of domestic—credit expansion sufficiently high that defense of the fixed
exchange rate is inconsistent with the government's budget constraint.
Only in these cases is there a sense in which excessive domestic—credit
expansion necessarily leads to the collapse of the exchange—rate regime.
The intuition underlying this result is quite simple. As the central
bank borrows reserves so that it can buy money from domestic residents,
the government's external interest bill grows and the public's external
interest income grows by the same amount. The government can therefore
service external debt by taxing away the public's foreign interest earnings.
If domestic credit is growing, however, the government is financingpart
of its expenditures through fresh external borrowing. Only if the rate
of domestic credit growth is smaller than the world interest rate r* is
the accumulated interest on official external borrowing paid off
entirely through domestic taxes Over the government's planning horizon.
More formally, write the discounted present value of transferpay-
ments to the individual as
—t -t -t (Dt_i to(l+r*)ht =to(l+r*)r*R1 + +r*)
[(a_l)L ]-gJ. (22)
With the aid of (21),thefirst sum on the right-hand side of (22) can be
written
-t D_1cor*(l_at (1 +r*)r*R*=(1+r*)R*+ 2 t0 tl —l s t0 (1 +r*)t17
The second sum on the right-hand side of (22) equals
D t








÷ (1 +r*)—r*(l +r*)+(o-1)(1 +r*)
-t
=(1+r*)R1- + r*)g
Provided the external debt does not rise "too quickly," the path of
transfers individuals expect has a present value just equal to the govern-
ment's initial assets minus the present value of future government con-
sumption. In the long run, therefore, all official foreign debt is
repaid through domestic taxation.
The preceding analysis has assumed an idealized environment in
which lump-sum taxes are available and all private income is subject to
taxation. In practice, however, the limits to domestic-credit growth
will be much more stringent than indicated above. Consider, for example,
an economy in which output is produced according to the linear technology
y =, whereZ is labor supply and agents derive utility from leisure
-I.If only labor income is subject to taxation, the amount of revenue18
that can be generated from taxes is limited. In this case, even rules of
the form (20) with 1 <a<(1+r*)are inconsistent with the official
resource constraint, for the latter requires that tax revenue grow
without bound.
The foregoing example is an extreme one, but it illustrates an
important practical point. Ongoing domestic credit growth, even if
moderate, causes a continual redistribution of external interest income
from the government to the private sector. A necessary condition for
government solvency is that private external interest earnings be ob-
servable by the government and taxable. It is precisely because this
necessary condition does not hold in practice that massive capital flight
so often foreshadows external financing difficulties for the government
involved.19
IV.Equilibrium with a Speculative Attack
This section studies the equilibrium path of an economy whose
fixed exchange rate must eventually be abandoned. The previous section
demonstrated that a continually declining stock of official foreign
reserves need not, in itself, force the abandonment of a fixed exchange
rate s. For some paths of domestic credit growth, the central bank can
borrow indefinitely and meet its interest charges through domestic
taxation. However, I will assume here that this is not the case, and
that the central bank is unable to borrow externally after its reserves,
initially positive, reach zero. For example, credit might be unavailable
to the bank if it announced its intention of allowing domestic credit
to grow at a rate c >(1+r*)forever. Potential creditors would then
know that the government planned to avoid paying its foreign debts in the
long run. The assumption that the central bank cannot borrow reserves is
quite arbitrary, though. A satisfactory discussion of the credit con-
straints faced by governments would require a much more complex model.9
The exchange rate must be allowed to float once reserves have
been exhausted, and I will assume here that the floating-rate regime that
follows the fixed rate's collapse is permanent.'0 To characterize the
transition between regimes, it is first necessary to characterize the
economy's equilibrium path under the float. This can be done with the
help of the solution to the individual's problem developed above.
From equation (4) ,theequilibrium path of real balances must
satisfy20
u'(c)rn =v'(m)m+ uv(c)mtl(MS/Ms) (23)
under the foating—rate regime. Because central-bank reserves are zero






Implicit in (24) is the assumption of conveneience that the breakdown of
the fixed—rate regime entails no change in the domestic-credit growth rule.
Together, (23) and (24) yield
[u'(c) —v'(m)]m
=(3/o)u'(c)m1. (25)
As in Brock (1974) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), standard regularity
conditions ensure that the unstable difference equation (25) possesses a
unique positive stationary solution m. This stationary solution is the
economy's saddle-path equilibrium. Given the path (24) of monetary growth,
m determines the equilibrium path St =(GtD)/mfor the floating exchange
rate. It is assumed thatwhile the exchange rate floats, the economy is at
its saddle-path equilibrium.11' 12
Let T denote the first period of the floating-rate regime.If the
regime—invariant growth rate of domestic credit o were 0, we would have
T =inthe present model. I will now argue that for> 0, there is a
unique T <consistent with perfect—foresight equilibrium.As will be21
shown below, the equilibrium path involves a sharp reduction in private
money balances (and hence in official reserve holdings) at time T-l. Any
reserves remaining in the central bank's portfolio after this speculative
attack are acquired by the public in a second attack at time T.
13
The argument again centers around Euler condition (4) and the
fact that c must equal c, for all t, in equilibrium.' Consider the unique
t such that
vI(ctlD0/S) > u'(c)[l -(Sm/atD0)]
(26)
but
v' (ctD0/S) <u'(c) [1 -(Srn/ot+lD0)].
(27)
Figure 1 illustrates its determination, demonstrating existence
and uniqueness subject to familiar regularity conditions.15 The figure
implies that the date determined by conditions (26) and (27) is the unique
date T on which the exchange rate first floats. This is in fact the case,
and the proof must show that (i) the economy is not in equilibrium on
every date if the exchange rate first floats before period T, (ii) the
economy is not in equilibrium on every date if the exchange rate first
floats after period T, and (iii) the economy is in equilibrium on every
date if the exchange rate first floats in period T. The date of the initial
speculative attack, T-l, is thus uniquely determined.








M =S}+ D. (28)
Suppose the exchange rate first floats in period T' <T.This means that






If (29) holds as an equality, the economy is in equilibrium if STe =S.
The central bank can thus succeed in holding the exchange rate fixed at
S by selling all the reserves remaining at the end of period T'—l. This
implies that the exchange rate does not float until period T'+l, in con-
tradiction to what was assumed. If (29) is a strict inequality, indi-
vidual plans cannot be optimal at time T'--that is, equation (4) cannot
hold——unless the market—determined exchange rate STe < S.(This follows
from the assumed strict concavity of v(rn).) We therefore need to ask
whether the exchange rate can appreciate in the first period of floating
along an equilibrium path. The answer is that it cannot. In period
T'-l, there will be a private capital inflow——and a rise in official re-
serves——in anticipation of the appreciation at T'. If the exchange
rate is to float in period T', agents must have an incentive to purchase
the central bank's reserve stock at the period's beginning. But if they
expect the exchange rate to appreciate to S, instantaneously, no such in-
centive exists. Therefore the central bank can continue to peg through
period T' if (29) is a strict inequality.
(ii)Suppose the exchange rate first floats in period T' > T.23
As figure 1 shows, (27) must then hold for t =T'—l.Since the exchange
rate, by hypothesis, does not float until period T', it is fixed at S





An exchange rate path satisfying (30) cannot be an equilibrium, as it violates
Euler equation (4). Even if reserves were zero at time T'-l, individuals
would have an incentive to reduce their real balances by one unit in
period T'-l, consuming the proceeds in that period and replenishing their
real balances on date T'. Since consumers cannot do this in the aggregate
without moving the exchange rate, the exchange rate would have to float on
date T'-l, contrary to what was assumed.
(iii) Consider now the case in which the exchange rate first floats
at time T. Prior to date T—l equation (4) holds if m =rn(see equation
(18)). Up until T-l, therefore, the nominal money supply is constant and
reserves steadily decline. On date T-l there is a sharp reduction in the
nominal money stock in anticipation of next period's depreciation. But
by (26) there is a nonnegative reserve level R1 such that
u' (c)v' (SR +T-10)/S] u' (c)
= 0 + . (31)
s
Thus(4) can hold through time T—l with no collapse of the exchange rate,
although it is possible that =0.Equation (27) now implies that
ondate T, there would be an excess supply of real balances at the ex-24
change rate S even if the central bank used all its remaining reserves
to purchase domestic money. The equilibrium floating exchange rate ST
therefore exceeds S, as agents expected at time T—l. In contrast to the
case discussed above in the proof of Ci), the public now has anincentive
to acquire any remaining central—bank reserves, and does so. At the
beginning of period T, agents sell domestic money in an attempt to bring
their real balances to the desired level. The central bank buys asmuch as
it can, given its remaining reserves, but this does not stem the exchange
rate's rise. Agents lucky enough to have purchased reserves from thebank
at price S reap a capital gain ST —Sper unit. If it so happens that
=0,there is no second attack: :ecause agents cannot reduce their
nominal balances in this case, the money market is equilibrated entirely
through the depreciation of the currency. In any tvent (28) and thedefini-
tion of m imply
u' (c) v' (M/ST) Su' (c)
= +
ST ST ST+l
so that (4) holds on each date. Accordingly, the path alongwhich the
exchange rate first floats on date T is an equilibrium pathfor the economy.1
The proof that the first date of floating is uniquely determined is
now complete. A potentially bothersome aspect of the equilibriumcon-
structed is that the central bank may hold positive reserves at theend
of period T-l even though speculators who acquire them at the beginning
of period T profit at the bank's expense.17 It is worthwhile making
sure that an individual cannot gain by reducing his money balances25
in period T—l through the additional purchase of official reserves.
Consider an individual who reduces his nominal balances by a unit in
period T-l, buying reserves and then selling them for money on the
market at time T. This individual forgoes monetary services worth
v'(mTl/S)/S in terms of utility, but acquires interest-bearing assets
worth ut(c)/S ex dividend in utility terms (recall that P* =1).The
tirne—T cost of repurchasing the money sold at time T-l has a present
value of u' (c)/ST .Interms of present-value utility at time T-l,
the sequence of transactions described yields a net gain of
u' Cc) v' (mTl) u' (c)
s
Butby (31), this net gain equals zero. The individual therefore has no
incentive to acquire further central-bank reserves in T-l, even if
>0.
How does the domestic nominal interest rate behave along a path
involving a crisis? Because real balances are constant at m from time
T onward, the exchange rate must rise at the same rate as the nominal
money supply. Thus (1 +r)=a(l+r*)for t >Tis implied by the
interest-parity condition (7) .Similarly,(1 +r) (1 +r*)for t <
T-1.So it remains to determine the nominal interest rate in period T—l.
First note that, by (25) ,mis given implicitly by
v' (rn) =u'(C)[1-(3/a)). (32)26
Second note that, by (31), the ratio can be no greater than 0;
forif it were, we would have mT <mTl
<, contradictingthe fact that
mT =rn.Finally note that if =0,ST/S =o,and so cT_iD /s=
m.In this case the nominal money supply grows exactly by the factor c
between T—l and T, and if prices rose by less than this factor we would
need T+iT <T'
<cto induce agents to hold higher real balances
in period T than in T—l. This againcontradicts the fact that the economy
must be in its new steady state, given by (32) ,inperiod T.
The upshot of this is that if =0,(1 +rT_l)
=a(l+r*).
If RT1 >0,(1 +r*) (1 +rT_l)
<o(l+r*).In the first case,
the economy is in its new steady state after the single speculative
attack in period T—l. As will be shown in the next section, this is
always true in continuous time.27
V. Speculative Attacks in Continuous Time
To study attack equilibria in continuous time, I briefly rework
the preceding discussion in terms of a market period of arbitrary length
n. (The previous sections implicitly assumed n =1.)Let t now denote
calendar time measured in steps of length n. A continuous—time model
will be obtained by taking the limit of discrete-time models as n+O.
The representative agent must consume at a constant rate c over
period t, and he derives utility nu(c) from doing so. Similarly, he
derives utility nv(m) from holding a constant level of real balances
rn over period t. The agent's intertemporal objective takes the form
-t/n +n) n[u(c) +v(m)]
and it is maximized subject to the constraints
At_At =Stny +nrB+(nr*St+St_ S )B* +H -Snc
and (3). The argument in the appendix can be extended to yield necessary
conditions for an optimal individual plan. The ones that will concern us
here are the analogues of (4) and (6) ,respectively:






' t t t+n
u'(c) =(l+nr*)/(l+fló)JU'(C). (34)28
If once again =r*(assumption (8)), (34) implies that the path of
consumption is flat. The equilibrium constant consumption level c
is determined by a national intertemporal resource constraint similar
to (17)
To analyze attacks in continuous time, it is again helpful to first
analyze the behavior of the economy under a regime of pure floating.
Let the fixed, regime—invariant growth rate of domestic—credit growth
be p; thus,
Dt/Dt =1+nii. (35)
The analogue of equation (25) follows from (33) and (35)
[U'(C) — nv'(m )]m =u'(c)m/(l +n)(1 +nii). (36)
tt t+n
Equation (36) has a unique positive stationary value, denoted m(n).
This constant level of real balances defines the economy's saddle-path
equilibrium. m(n) is given implicitly by the equation
u' (c) [n( +)+n2uI. - v'[m(n)]= (37)
n(l +n)(1 +n)
By taking the limit of the right-hand side of (37) as n-O, one finds
that the equilibrium level of real balances in the continuous-time




We may now study the transition between the fixed- and floating—
rate regimes. Consider again a model with market period of length n.
As in the previous section (equation (26)), the exchange rate first
floats on the latest date T(n) such that
v'f(l +n)[T(n)_n]/nD
1 0 >nl -[s/(l+T(n)1
(39)
u' Cc)
T(n) is a continuous function of the market period n.
As was demonstrated at the end of the previous section, the
exchange rate on the first day of floating, STr must satisfy the
inequality
ST/S <1+np. (40)
Only when R() =0is (40) an equality; and in this case (39) holds
with equality as well. It is clear that ST() is a continuous function
of n and that
lim S =S. (41) T(n) n-O
Now T() =[(1+fl)T(n)/nD0]/(fl),and, by (37), m(n) is a con-




According to (42), the regime change for a continuous-time model occurs
on the unique date T(0) such that e4T(O)D0/s =m(0).This date alone has
the property that a single speculative attack in which the public acquires
all the central bank's reserves moves the economy to its new saddle—path
equilibrium with no jump in the exchange rate.
To summarize, the present continuous-time maximizing model supports
the exchange-rate continuity condition invoked by Krugman (1979) and
others to study crises in descriptive models. In contrast to the
previous discrete—time analysis the regime change involves a single
speculative attack, timed so as to move the economy to its floating-
rate equilibrium with no discrete jump in the exchange rate.With
continuous trading and perfect foresight, therefore, the analogy between
attacks in resource markets and in the foreign exchange market is quite
close. The reason is that it is only in continuous time that an anticipated
discrete asset-price jump generally entails "abnormal profit opportunities.31.
VI. Limitations and Extensions
This paper has described the collapse of a fixed exchange rate in
an intertemporal general-equilibrium model with perfect foresight. The
goal of the exercise was to examine critically the analogy between speculative
attacks in resource markets, as studied by Salant and Henderson (1978) and
Salant (1983), and attacks on a moribund fixed exchange rate. While the
analogy was found to be close in continuous time, a discrete—time model led
to the possibility of two, successive speculative attacks, the first occur-
ring the period before the exchange rate begins to float.
An important limitation of the analysis is the deterministic environ-
ment assumed throughout. A feature of the discrete-time equilibria studied
above is that there is exactly one period in which the exchange rate is
fixed but the equilibrium domestic interest exceeds the exogenous world
rate. In this period before the exchange rate first floats, domestic
residents reduce their real balances, possibly (but not necessarily) driving
the central bank's reserves to zero. In a stochastic model such as that of
Flood and Garber (l984a), the domestic interest rate exceeds the
world rate whenever there is a possibility of an exchange—rate collapse
next period. If speculation is defined as any private acquisition of reserves
in anticipation of a possible collapse, it is clear that a stochastic setup
in which money demand is a decreasing function of the home interest rate can
be characterized by arbitrarily many speculative "attacks" The sharp contrast
with the single attack of the resource model arises here becausemoney
and bonds are not perfect substitutes. But it is possible that a similar
result could be derived in resource models such as Salant's (1983) if32
additional assets with stochastic returns were introduced and if the
speculator's portfolio decision were addressed explicitly.
A further limitation of the analysis is that it is restricted to
a policy environment of a particularly simple nature: the central bank
pursues a constant rate of domestic credit expansion regardless of the
exchange—rate regime, and makes no effort to avoid the fixed rate's
collapse other than intervening until its reserves are exhausted.
No claim is made that this policy is an any sense optimal. Rather, the
aim is to create a situation, similar to that arising in nonrenewable resource
markets, in which a breakdown of the price-fixing scheme is inevitable.
It would be enlightening to introduce official preferences and study
whether speculative attacks can result from the authorities' pursuit of
optimal policies. As a preliminary step it would be useful to extend
the analysis of this paper to more general, but still exogenous, policy
environments.
The paper devoted considerable attention to the official inter-
temporal budget constraint and its implications for feasible domestic—
credit growth under a fixed exchange rate.In principle there need be no
lower bound on a central bank's foreign reserves. External borrowing in
support of the exchange rate can continue indefinitely provided domestic
taxes rise sufficiently to service the debt incurred.There are rates
of domestic—credit growth so high, however, that the indefinite support of
the exchange rate is inconsistent with public-sector solvency.33
Appendix
This appendix shows how to derive the necessary conditions (4)—(6)
in the text. Let denote the utility shadow price of nominal saving
(2) at time t and the Lagrange multiplier for the portfolio constraint
(3). Necessary conditions for an optimal individual program are found by














with respect to Mti 'E,
and Ati for all t. This yields
u'(c) =XS, (Al)





Equation (4) follows immediately from (Al) ,(A2),and (A5). One
obtains (5) by combining (Al), (A4), and (A5). Similarly, combination of
(Al) ,(A3),and(AS) leads to (6)34
Footnotes
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1. See, for example, Blanco and Garber (1982), Connolly and Taylor (1984)
Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1983), Flood and Garber (1984a), Obstfeld (1984a, b),
and Wyplosz (1983). Flood and Garber (1984b) study a related tooic, the pos-
sible collapse of a gold-standard monetary regime.
2. In the free—market equilibrium of Salant's (1983) model, the resource
price rises at a rate equal to the exogenous discount rate; consumption
demand is a declining function of price; and the initial equilibrium
price equates the total supply to cumulative consumption demand over
the horizon of the economy. If an attack occurs on the first
date that the "shadow" free—market price of the resource exceeds the
official price, the remaining stock equals cumulative demand if the
market price rises at the rate of interest thereafter. If speculators
delay theirattack (by one period, say), next period's consumption, a
function of the official price, exceeds the level that would have prevailed
if the attack had already occurred. Since the remaining supply of the
resource is then lower a., well, its price must jump by more than the rate
of interest when the attack takes place. Otherwise, cumulative future
demand would exceed the initial supply. In continuous time, the integer
problem peculiar to discrete-time modeling disappears and the speculative35
attack takes place with no jump in the resource price. A similar integer
problem lies behind the "two-attack" equilibrium of the monetary model dis-
cussed below. That problem, too, disappears in continuous time. Note that
Salant (1983), in an appendix, offers a maximizing rationale for his model.
3. Flood and Garber (1984a) ,forexample, argue in a discrete-time context
that the attack must occur as soon as the "shadow" market rate exceeds the
peg S because "agents may purchase reserves from the central bank at price
S and resell those reserves immediately on the post—collapse market" at
a higher price. (A similar argument appears in Flood and Garber 1984b.)
The foregoing argument shows at best that if the collapse of the fixed
rate is expected, it will not pay for a single individual to refrain from
joining the attack.But it does not demonstrate that there is no other
equilibrium.Obstfeld (l984b) gives an example of an economy with multiple
equilibria in which the "shadow" exchange rate can exceed the peg without
necessarily inducing a run. Because of the particular policy environment
assumed by Flood and Garber (1984a), the exchange rate must indeed float
on the first day that the "shadow" rate passes through S. For a complete
proof, see Obstfeld (1984b) .Notsurprisingly, the proof parallels the
discussion in section IV, below.
4. McCallurn (1984) derives a similar result in a closed—economy model.
He shows that even if the inflation tax is not used, the stock ofgovern-
ment debt can rise forever (at a rate less than the real interest rate)
provided other taxes are raised over time to meet debt service. See also
Liviatan (1984) and Sargent (1984).36
5. As ususal, u(c) and v(m) are strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable, and satisfy the Iriada conditions.
6. With an arbitrary nonseparable utility function U(c,m), it is no
longer true that the constancy of the marginal utility of consumption
implies that consumption is constant. Thus, the separability assumption
embodied in (1) purchases simplicity, but it is not innocuous. This
issue is pursued further, in context, below; see footnote 14.
7. This follows from the assumed sparability of the instantaneous utility
function. See footnote 6.
8. If P* were rising, or if the pegged exchange rate were adjusted upward
over time by the central bank, the authorities would be able to collect
seigniorage equal to rn times the rate of domestic price inflation.
9. Imperfect information problems of the sort studied by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) would be at the heart of such a discussion.
10. Obstfeld (l984a) studies a transitory floating-rate regime.
11. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) show that the saddle—path quilibrium is
the unique equilibrium of the economy if the government guarantees some
minimal real redemption value for its currency.37
12. Once reserves are zero and the exchange rate floats, the transfer
rule (20) becomes h = + (a-1)(Di/s) =
—
(Mi/si)
= - Sti)/S]m.Thus (14) holds in the saddle—path equilibrium, with
all government consumption being financed through lump-sum taxes and
seigniorage. Constraint (15) holds trivially because reserves are con-
stant at zero.
13. One could argue that even if the exchange rate remains at S in
period T—1, T—1 is really the first period of floating if the initial
attack drives reserves to zero. The proofs below could be modified to
reflect this alternative definition, but no substantive differences would
emerge. This inconsequential ambiguity disappears in Continuous time.
14. If the instantaneous utility function in (1) were not separable in
c and m, this would not be true (see footnote 6)Even though
equilibrium consumption is invariant with respect to unanticipated,
permanent changes in inflation, it is not invariant with respect to anticipated
changes if U 0.While consumption would therefore be flat after
the regime change, both consumption and real balances would be moving
beforehand in anticipation of the heightened inflation to come. Further,
the current account would not be balanced. The constant value of con-
sumption prevailing after the regime change would depend on the country's
stock of net foreign claims at the commencement of floatinc, and thus on
the history of the current account.38
15. If the two curves in figure 1. do not intersect at a positive t,
an attack must occur at t =0.
16. Along with the necessary conditions for individual optimality, the
ususual sufficient conditions also hold along the path constructed
(Arrow and Kurz 1970).
17. These profits disappear in the continuous-time model. Strictly
speaking, the analysis of the individual's problem should have incorporated
his expectation of being able to buy reserves from the bank on date T
at a price below the market price. Aside from the usual distributional
issues, this modification would raise no problems provided the individual
anticipated buying a finite, exogenous quantity of underpriced official
foreign reserves.In particular, the necessary conditions exploited
above would still hold: by offering speculators a one-sided bet on
date T, the central bank in effect offers them a transfer payment. It
should be clear that for this reason, the equilibrium consumption level
c, which is determined by (17), is unaffected.
18. This result will play a key role in the next section.39
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